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NOTES AND COMMENTS

In Monroe Bros. & Co. v. Lewald,25 the Court held it error to
dismiss supplemental proceedings when there was a creditor's bill (which
the court assumed to be a judgment creditor's bill instead of a general
creditor's bill) pending by another person and intimated that both creditor's bills and supplemental proceedings would be proper to reach some
types of property interests, by saying that the two proceedings should be
consolidated when they conflict, as where the same property is sought to
be subjected. In McIntosh Grocery Co. v. Newman,2 6 the Court said
that both remedies were still open to claimants in proper instances.
In the recent case of Corneliusv. Albertson,27 the plaintiff, a judgment
creditor of defendant, had an execution issued against the trustee of a
trust of which the defendant was the beneficiary. The res of the trust was
personal property. The trustee was not a party to the suit. The Court
said: "The plaintiff cannot reach by the execution she had issued the
property held in trust for defendant .... but must endeavor to reach it,
if she can, by a supplemental proceeding .... ,28

[Emphasis added.]

It is apparent from the foregoing cases that the Court has not always
required strict compliance with the clear cut rule stated in McCaskill v.
Lancashire. No case has been found, however, in which it was held
error to allow the remedy required by that rule.
WILLIAm G. RANSDELL, JR.
Judgments-Collateral Attack on Judgment Regular on Its Face
1
a husband sought to have his marriage
In Carpenterv. Carpenter,
annulled on the ground that a decree of divorce obtained by his spouse
from her former husband was a nullity. The allegations were that the
wife, having falsely sworn that she had lived separate and apart from
her former husband for two years, failed to meet the statutory requirements2 which thereby invalidated her divorce and rendered her marriage
to the plaintiff without legal efficacy. The North Carolina Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's denial of the wife's motion to strike the
allegations. In refusing to permit the plaintiff to attack collaterally the
prior decree, the Court said:

held by another person) ; Johnson Cotton Co., Inc. v. Reaves, 225 N. C. 436, 35
S. E. 2d 408 (1945) (an interest in a judgment recovered against another).
'"107 N. C. 655, 12 S. E. 287 (1890).
26184 N. C. 370, 114 S. E. 535 (1922).
2T244 N. C. 265, 93 S.E. 2d 147 (1956).
28Id.at 268, 93 S.E. 2d at 150. At the same page the Court, when referring to
the Supplemental Proceedings statute (N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-352 et seq.), said, "...
the provisions of this article are intended to supply the place of a proceeding in
equity, where relief was given after a creditor has determined his debt by a judgment at law and was unable to obtain satisfaction by process of law."
1244 N. C. 286, 93 S. E. 2d 617 (1956). See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 50-4 and
as to annulment.
§ 51-3
2
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1950).
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"As against challenge on the ground of false swearing, by way
of pleading and of evidence, relating to the cause or ground for
divorce, a divorce decree, in all respects regular on the face of the
judgment roll, is at most voidable, not void."'
The Carpenter case involves a consideration of the following: (1)
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional factors; (2) direct and collateral
attacks; and (3) void and voidable judgments.
Jurisdictional factors go to the very heart of the matter 4-they involve the question of whether or not the court had the power to hear
and determine the issue. A judgment rendered without jurisdiction is a
nullity. Non-jurisdictional factors, on the other hand, involve the irregular or erroneous use of its judicial power by a court which ostensibly
had jurisdictional power. A judgment rendered under such circumstances is not a nullity. It is a valid judgment until reversedY
A direct attack upon a judgment is an attack made in the very proceeding in which the judgment was rendered, or on an appeal therefrom,
or by some separate proceeding provided by law for that sole purpose.0
If, on the other hand, the action or proceeding has an independent
purpose and contemplates some other relief or result, although the overturning of the judgment may be important or even necessary to its
success, then the attack on the judgment is said to be a collateral attack.7
It is the element of jurisdiction that differentiates a void from a
voidable judgment." When a jurisdictional element is missing, the court
has no authority to render any judgment at all. Therefore, any judgment rendered by such court is void-a nullity which may be attacked
whenever it is offered in any proceeding. A voidable judgment, however, takes effect as intended, and continues to be effectual for all intents
and purposes until it is set aside or nullified by judicial decree.9 A
judgment that is irregular or voidable cannot be attacked collaterally.
The remedy is by direct attack through motion in the cause. 10
It is held that the recitation in a judgment of jurisdictional facts, if
not contradicted by the record, will be presumed to be true, and cannot
be denied or questioned in any collateral proceeding. 1 Under this rule
-244 N. C. 286, 295, 93 S.E. 2d 617, 625 (1956).
'Woodside-Florence Irr. Dist., 121 Mont. 346, 194 P. 2d 241 (1948), Chase v.
Christianson, 41 Cal. 253, 106 P. 2d 239 (1871).
'Lawson v. Moorman, 85 Va. 880, 9 S.E. 150 (1889).
'State ex rel and to Use of Coran v. Duncan, 333 Mo. 673, 63 S.W. 2d 135
(1933).
'Inter-River Drainage District of Missouri v. Henson, 99 S.W. 2d 865 (Mo.
1936). See also, 1 FREMAN, JUDGMENTs, § 321 (5th ed. 1925).
'Johnson v. Carroll, 190 Ky. 689, 228 S.W. 412 (1921).

'Voorhees v. Jackson ex dem The Bank of the United States, 35 U. S. 449

(1836) ; RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, § 4 (1942).
10 Clark v. Homes, 189 N. C. 703, 128 S. E. 20 (1925).

'x Stocks v. Stocks, 179 N. C. 285, 120 S. E. 306 (1920) ; Rackley v. Roberts,
147 N. C. 201, 60 S.E. 975 (1908) ; Rutherford v. Ray, 147 N. C. 253, 61 S. E. 57
(1908) ; Dunn v. Taylor, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 241, 94 S.W. 347 (1906).
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any judgment which is valid on the face of the record should never be
termed void. If it is necessary in attacking the judgment to present
evidence aliunde, the judgment is deemed voidable.12
In the Carpenter case the ground for divorce in the wife's action was
two years separation. This is a statutory ground for absolute divorce in
this state.' 3 Under this statute there are two requirements which the
husband and wife must meet in order to obtain the absolute divorce.
They are that the husband and wife shall have (1) lived separate and
apart for two years; and (2) the plaintiff, husband or wife, shall have
resided in this state for a period of six months. The North Carolina
Supreme Court has declared these requirements to be jurisdictional. 14
If either of these elements did not exist, the court would not have
jurisdiction to try the action and to grant a divorce. 15 If the court had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, the judgment in the
action is void.'0
The plaintiff in the Carpentercase alleged that his wife in her divorce
action had only been living separate and apart from her husband for a
few months. The defendant's motion to strike this allegation was denied
by the trial court, but granted by the North Carolina Supreme Court. If
this allegation be true, then the previously stated North Carolina holdings
indicate that the element of jurisdiction was missing and that the judgment rendered by the court was void. The court in the Carpenter case
said that since the judgment roll was regular on its face, the judgment
was at most voidable, not void.
A case on all fours occurred in Mississippi.' There the record of the
divorce proceeding was regular on its face and both parties to the action
were in court. A divorce was granted and the husband remarried. The
husband predeceased both his first and his second wife. Under the law
of that state the surviving widow is granted certain property rights. The
first wife asked the court to declare that she was the owner of all the
property of which the deceased died seised on the the ground that she
"Pinnell v. Burroughs, 168 N. C. 315, 84 S. E. 364 (1915) ; Albertson v.

Williams,
97 N. C.264, 1 S. E. 841 (1887); Bushee v. Surles, 77 N. C. 62 (1877).
1
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1950).

1Young v. Young, 225 N. C 340, 34 S. E. 2d 154 (1945) ; Oliver v. Oliver,
219
N.
19372. C. 299, 13 S. E. 2d 549 (1941) ; see Sears v. Sears, 92 F. 2d 530 (D. C. Cir.
S2Henderson v. Henderson, 232 N. C. 1, 59 S. E. 2d 227 (1950) ; Monroe v.
Niven, 221 N. C. 362, 20 S. E. 2d 311 (1942) ; Harrell v. Welstead, 206 N. C. 817,
175 S.
E. 283 (1934).
"0 Hopkins v. Hopkins, 132 N. C. 22, 43 S. E. 508 (1903) ; Martin v. Martin,
130 N. C. 27, 40 S. E. 822 (1902) ; Nichols v. Nichols, 128 N. C. 108, 38 S. E. 296
(1901)
; Holloman v. Holloman, 127 N. C. 15, 37 S. E. 68 (1900).
7
1 Hester v. Hester, 103 Miss. 13, 60 So. 6 (1912).
In Ex parte Edwards, 183
Ala. 659, 62 So. 775 (1913), the court refused to allow a husband to attack his
former wife's divorce decrees (the attack was, of necessity, a collateral attack)
when he alleged that the former divorce had been obtained collusively. The court
said that "for aught appearing, the ground of the divorce there set-up existed and

was proved by trustworthy testimony."
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was his lawful widow. Collaterally she made the attack on the decree
claiming that it was illegally obtained. The court, in rejecting this
collateral attack upon a judgment roll regular on its face, stated:
"Whether the court had the proper evidence before it on which to
base a decision cannot be inquired into collaterally .... The rule
is absolutely essential, in order that faith and credit may be accorded by the community to the decrees and judgments of courts
of record; and that parties acting in obedience to them, or
acquiring rights under them, may have the confidence and
repose flowing from a conviction that the solemn judgments
and decisions of the higher courts, so long as they remain unreversed, will not be disregarded."' 8
In the Carpentercase the court was faced with the difficult problem
of having to balance the apparent injustice to the plaintiff and the public
policy involved as pointed out in the Mississippi case. To permit the
case to be relitigated would be to cast a shadow upon all cases regular
on the record. Conversely, the fraud could not be approved. This
dilemma was resolved by an extremely restricted split decision. It is
submitted that the majority and dissent do not disagree upon the same
issue, but rather that they are taking the case from different phases.
The majority are not allowing this plaintiff to bring this attack under
these circumstances, whereas it isthe dissent's view that the attack is
proper because it raises jurisdictional questions. It is not doubted that
the majority would agree with the dissent as to the jurisdictional questions if the majority allowed the case to get to that point. Apparently,
therefore, the opinion says only that in this case and under this set of
facts and circumstances, the jurisdictional questions may not be raised.
If this is the view of the majority, there is no inconsistency with the
former opinions of this Court.' 9
A consideration of divorce and jurisdiction immediately brings to
mind the famous Williams cases. 20 Although the Williams cases concerned the jurisdictional question of domicile and the party attacking the
jurisdiction was the State of North Carolina, the two cases do have
points in common. First, the jurisdictional aspect of the divorce was
attacked by one not a party to the suit; second, in each case it is contended that to recognize the divorce would result in damage to an innocent party. There is, however, one major distinguishing point in the
two cases. In the Williams case the State of North Carolina, the party
attacking collaterally, had a present interest in the litigation at the time
103 Miss. 13, 28, 60 So. 6, 21 (1912).
'p244 N. C. 304, 93 S. E. 2d 633 (1956).
20Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942); Williams v. North
Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
's
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of the divorce. 21 It was upon this theory that the State could prosecute
the parties for adultery upon their second marriage which followed a
fraudulent divorce from the first marriage. Conversely, in the Carpenter
case the party attempting to collaterally attack had no interest in the prior
divorce of his spouse at the time of the divorce. Only upon his marriage,
which followed the divorce by some time, could he be called an interested
party. It seems to be only in this latter type of case that the Court will
allow the judgment record valid on its face to stand against a collateral
attack.
Applying this same theory which seems to be borne out in the recent
case of Harmon v. Harmon,22 it would seem that the party obtaining the
fraudulent divorce in the Carpentercase could be subject to prosecution
23
for adultery by the State.
If the allegations made by the plaintiff in the Carpentercase are true,
it would appear that the wife in the divorce action was a party to a fraud
upon a Superior Court of North Carolina. Through this fraud, she was
able to obtain a decree of absolute divorce. With this decree she was
legally married to the plaintiff. Now she and her second husband (the
plaintiff) are living separate and apart. As she is the wife of her second
husband in the eyes of the law, she stands in a potential position of being
able to obtain suport and maintenance from him. This she may do by
virtue of the fraud she perpetrated upon the Superior Court. The husband, on the other hand, is not able to attack the decree and to protect
himself by any legal means. In the Carpenter case he was denied the
right to make a collateral attack. In the cases of Shaver v. Shaver2 4
he was denied the right to make a direct attack by a motion in the cause
because he had not been a party thereto. The court itself has the power
ex mero motu to reopen the original divorce case by reason of the fraud,
but this must be done upon the motion of the court and is solely in the
court's discretion.2 5 Perhaps by appearing as a friend of the court in
" In the second Williams case Justice Frankfurter in the majority opinion
said: "But those not parties to a litigation ought not to be foreclosed by the
interested actions of others; especially not a state which is concerned with the

vindication of its own social policy and has no means, certainly no effective means,
to protect that interest against the selfish action of those outside its borders....

As to the truth or existence of a fact, like that of domicil, a State not a party to
the exertion of such judicial authority in another State but seriously affected by it

has a right when asserting its own unquestioned authority, to ascertain the truth or
existence of that crucial fact." 325 U. S.226, 230 (1945).
Harmon v. Harmon, 245 N. C. 83, 95 S. E. 2d 355 (1956).
.3In the Harmon case the court says, "Since an absolute divorce dissolves the
marriage tie, ...subsequent intercourse between a former spouse and a third
person does not constitute adultery, provided a final decree has been rendered, and
no fraud was practiced to obtain it." It follows that cohabitation pursuant to second
marriage would constitute adultery if parties to second marriage obtained divorce
decree through collusion and in bad faith or by fraud.

244 N. C. 309, 93 S.E. 2d 614 (1956) ; 244 N. C. 311, 93 S.E. 2d 615 (1956).
State v. Davis, 203 N. C. 35, 164 S.E. 737 (1932) ; Mann v. Mann, 176 N. C.
353, 97 S.E. 175 (1918) ; Durham v. Cotton Mills, 144 N. C. 705, 57 S.E. 465
(1907) ; Summerlin v. Cowles, 107 N. C. 459, 12 S.E. 234 (1890).
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induce the court to
inero inot, and to
fraud. Clearly the
tied."'20

HENRY M.

WHITESIDES

Search Warrants-Requisites for a Valid Warrant to Search for
Unlawfully Possessed Liquor
In a recent decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court, State v.
White,1 it was held that a search warrant, obtained from a justice of the
peace by a constable upon the latter's oral testimony under oath that he
had reason to believe that defendant had intoxicating liquor in her
home, and giving a description thereof, was invalid and the evidence
obtained under the warrant incompetent because the requisite provisions
of G. S. § 15-272 had not been complied with. Specifically the court
found the warrant defective because the issuing officer had not required
the constable to sign an affidavit under oath to support the issuance of
the warrant as required by G. S. § 15-27,3 which provides as follows:
Warrant issued without affidavit and examination of complainant or other person; evidence discovered thereunder incompetent.-Any officer who shall sign and issue or cause to be
signed and issued a search warrant without first requiring the
complainant or other person to sign an affidavit under oath and
examining said person or complainant in regard thereto shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor; and no facts discovered by reason of
the issuance of such illegal search warrant shall be competent as
evidence in the trial of any action: Provided, no facts discovered
or any evidence obtained without a legal search warrant in the
course of any search, made under conditions requiring the issuance
of a search warrant, shall be competent as evidence in the trial of
any action.
The application of this statute to determine the validity of a warrant
authorizing a search for unlawfully possessed liquor conflicts with several
earlier decisions of the Supreme Court. In State v. McLamb, 4 in dismissing defendant's contention that the trial court erred in admitting
"In Patrick v. Patrick, 245 N. C. 195, 95 S. E. 2d 585 (1956), which was
decided after this case, the court allowed a party not served but who was interested
at the time of the divorce to attack the prior divorce. It was clear that the party
making the attack was an interested party at the time of the divorce and that the
point upon which he based his attack had not been part of the controversy and
adjudicated at the previous trial.
1244 N. C. 73 (1956).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953).
Ibid.

'235 N. C. 251, 69 S.E. 2d 537 (1952).

